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A B S T R A C T
While developing countries around the world are preparing to implement REDD+, there is a debate on the possible role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the
private sector and smallholder stakeholders in reducing emissions. Drawing on a case of Indonesia, an early leader on REDD+, this paper investigates the role of
fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector to reduce forest-based emissions and the implications for improving the forest sector governance. In particular the
study highlights the perspectives of a range of forest sector stakeholders on the role of fiscal instruments that contribute either positively or negatively to reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia. The study comprised a review of the existing instruments in Indonesia, as well as surveys and
interviews. An online survey and structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with a range of forest sector stakeholders, including government, civil society,
academia, and palm oil concession holders. Findings indicate that there is a range of formal and informal fiscal instruments at the various jurisdictional levels, and a
variety of incentives and disincentives. More emphasis on cross-sectoral co-ordination, alternatives to commodities such as palm oil, and continued land reform, is
required.
1. Introduction: climate change, forest-based emissions, and
Indonesian fiscal policy
The global climate initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD+), negotiated under the UNFCCC in
2005, seeks to provide financial incentives for developing countries to
reduce carbon emissions from forests and encourages the conservation,
management, and enhancement of forest stocks particularly in devel-
oping countries (Mbatu, 2016; Khatri et al., 2018; Sheng et al., 2018).
The concept of REDD+ received widespread attention after the UN
Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP15) as a
means to contribute performance based payments to reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation (UNFCCC, 2011). In recent
years, there has been a growing interest in REDD+ as a means to mi-
tigate greenhouse gas emissions as well as biodiversity and ecosystem
protection (Mbatu, 2015; Nielsen, 2016). Increasingly, policy-makers
and other actors including the private sector and civil society are be-
ginning to understand the potential role of REDD+ as a tool of global
forest governance (Mbatu, 2015; Roessing Neto, 2015). REDD+ has a
role to play in providing financial flows from the international to local
levels (Irawan et al., 2014), thereby bringing incentives to developing
countries to eliminate and act on the historial trend to deforest and
transform forest land to other land-use activities (Sheng et al., 2018).
As the repository of the world's third-largest area of tropical rain-
forest, Indonesia has been identified as playing a potentially significant
global role in combatting climate change and deforestation and was an
early leader in implementing REDD+ (Fay and Denduangrudee, 2018).
Its forests have been subjected to major transformation over recent
decades, however, largely on account of extensive changes to forest
composition, and conversion to plantations (Sahide et al., 2016). Forest
loss increased from the 1970s to the mid 1990s as a result of a growing
log-export industry and agricultural crop production. From the mid
1990s to 2015 illegal logging in Indonesia increased at the same time as
international demand for timber rose. It has been claimed that changes
to forestry regulations from 2011 have led to some decline in defor-
estation rates (Tsujino et al., 2016). This change has been attributed
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partially to the influence of international forest regimes on domestic
policy through the provision of financial support, exemplified by In-
donesia's development of Forest Management Units (FMUs, or Kesatuan
Pengelolaan Hutan – KPH), and global initiatives such as REDD+, fi-
nanced by a range of donor countries (Sahide et al., 2016). While the
question as to how REDD+ will be financed and how to deal with the
drivers of deforestation such as oil palm plantation, commentators
question whether it will tackle the root causes of deforestation (Hein
et al., 2018).1
Consequently, the country faces many hurdles in its efforts to reduce
forest-based emissions. The country's peatlands, for example, are the
largest source of forest-based emissions of any nation globally, and
bringing them into the carbon reduction economy has significant eco-
nomic potential (Abram et al., 2016). However, forgoing the con-
tributions to the domestic economy from activities that impact nega-
tively on forests – including the revenue that such activities bring in in
terms of taxes and charges – is not easy. Initiating alternative govern-
ance arrangements, when provincial and district governments benefit
from the redistribution of this revenue makes it all the more difficult.
Creating viable, alternative, land-use incentives to business-as-usual
practices in such a decentralized, high-emitting, tropical forest country
context therefore has considerable relevance for other developing
countries seeking to combat deforestation, and climate change (Irawan
et al., 2013).
The Indonesian government has also developed a detailed strategy
for reducing national emissions from forest-based activities by using a
variety of fiscal incentives, including benefit-sharing arrangements and
results-based payments for verifiable emissions reductions. These ac-
tions notwithstanding, there are considerable implementation chal-
lenges in achieving forest-based emissions generated by private sector
companies, as well as from forest fires, and there is debate as how in-
centives should be applied (Saito-Jensen et al., 2014; Purnomo et al.,
2017). Proponents argue that fiscal incentives entering into national
budgetary system can achieve REDD+ goals by providing incentives to
the stakeholders (Irawan et al., 2013). However, considering the role of
fiscal instruments in the implementation of REDD+, there is limited
analysis of the perspectives of a wider range of forest sector stake-
holders on the role of fiscal incentives and disincentives that contribute
either positively or negatively to reducing forest-based emissions in
Indonesia.
The Cancún and Paris Agreements both permit and encourage non-
state actors (“non-Party stakeholders”) to play a role in combatting
climate change (UNFCCC, 2011; UNFCCC, 2015). The national policy
environment engendered in Indonesia by these agreements presents an
opportunity to redirect income generated from non-tax state revenue
(NTSR) to private sector and community-based management activities
for emissions reduction activities. The timber industry as a whole,
whether they are active in natural forests or pulpwood plantations, is
expected to contribute to government income through fees, levies and
royalties, referred to in Indonesian as Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak
(PNBP). State revenue, particularly NTSR, has been identified as po-
tentially applicable to forest conservation and emissions reduction in
Indonesia, by means of intergovernmental fiscal transfer, with condi-
tions that funds provided be not used for other purposes (Irawan et al.,
2014; Nurfatriani et al., 2015).
The remainder of the paper examines the role of global climate fi-
nance in Indonesia, and continues with an in-depth exploration of na-
tional fiscal instruments of relevance to the forestry sector, and their
role in reducing forest-based emissions. Data were generated from an
online survey of national stakeholders conducted in 2016, and com-
ments collected during face to face interviews in 2016–2017. A final
section summarises the views of research participants, and provides
some observations as to how Indonesia's fiscal instruments can con-
tribute positively to the country's emissions reduction targets and cli-
mate policy more generally. Policy solutions identified by interviewees
are also included.
2. Financing emissions reductions in Indonesia
Global financing mechanisms designed to support climate change
actions are largely contained in Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which
includes provisions for financial support from developed to developing
countries to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of global warming.
Funding needs to be transparently communicated to the public and
requires formal approval mechanisms. The global funds for climate
action increased by more than 70% from USD 28.8 billion to USD 49.4
billion between 2011 and 2016, providing a great incentive for devel-
oping countries to shift their conventional development towards the
green economy. Most financial support instruments are grants, followed
by loans through multilateral, bilateral and regional cooperation me-
chanisms. Multilateral channels include the Global Environment
Facility, the Green Climate Fund, various UNFCCC trust Funds, and
financial institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank,
and the International Finance Corporation. Of the total funds, no more
than 6% are designated for the forestry sector (UNFCCC, 2016).
The Paris Agreement is of major significance for the future design
and implementation of REDD+, particularly for the private sector,
whilst maintaining a central role for the state. Article 5 re-endorses
existing frameworks for REDD+ and the results-based model for pay-
ments for reducing emissions as well as calling for alternative ap-
proaches to policy making processes. Article 6.4 on the other hand
refers to the somewhat vague notion of a sustainable development
mechanism (SDM) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, which leaves
the option open for a replacement (or continuation) of the market-
based Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 2015). The
reasons for separating REDD+ from the negotiations around the SDM
appears to be an attempt to allow REDD+ negotiations to continue,
while the more contentious discussions between pro-market and anti-
market governmental Parties to the Convention continue. It keeps the
door open for voluntary, private-sector activities while also acknowl-
edging the desire for governmental control and non-market mechan-
isms (NMM) (Leonard, 2017). Importantly, the Paris Agreement also
welcomes the role of non-state actors in reducing emissions including
civil society, business, finance, cities and other jurisdictional authorities
at the subnational level (UNFCCC, 2015). This has been interpreted as a
good outcome for business as it keeps the regulatory and reporting
requirements in the hands of the state, as well as providing for a degree
of certainty in decision-making (Glynn et al., 2017).
In the context of non-state actors, Paris leaves open the option for
further incentive mechanisms for emissions reduction including na-
tional-level policies such as putting a price on carbon (UNFCCC, 2015).
These are positive developments, as private sector participation in
REDD+ has been historically impeded by policy uncertainty, the
dominance of the state in forest management thereby undermining
competition, as well as poor inter-sectoral co-ordination, and land te-
nure issues (Chokkalingam and Vanniarachchy, 2011). This has led to
less business involvement in the REDD+ process than other sectors,
despite the critical role of business and industry in making sustainable
land use decisions for REDD+ (Somorin et al., 2014). This has also led
to calls more efforts that should be put into development of financial
arrangements that can be applied in the context of REDD+, notably via
fiscal incentives aimed at encouraging private sector involvement, and
understanding what factors are required to encourage more business
participation in the reducing forest-based emissions (Henderson et al.,
2013).
The Government of Indonesia has conservatively estimated that
around USD 247 billion is required to implement the climate change
mitigation actions under the conditional NDC target of 2030.
1 See the paper by Tacconi and Muttaqin in this special issue for more details
on the REDD+ mechanism in Indonesia.
T. Cadman, et al. Forest Policy and Economics 108 (2019) 101913
2
Meanwhile, REDD+ implementation requires about USD 5.6 billion,
the second highest after the financial needs required for energy and
transportation sectors (MOEF, 2018). Funds generated will support four
prioritised REDD+ policies: reducing deforestation about 450 thousand
ha within 2011–2020 and about 325 thousand ha within 2021–2030;
enhancing the implementation of sustainable forest management prin-
ciples; rehabilitating up to 12 million hectares of degraded forest by
2030; and restoring approximately two million hectares of peatlands
(DJPPI, 2017).
In 2008, the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) es-
tablished a trust fund for the purposes of climate mitigation activities,
with pledges from France and Japan (USD$400 million each), Germany
and Australia (USD$30 million each) and the US (USD$2.8 million)
(Simamora, 2008). In 2010, Government Regulation No 46/2017 on
Environmental Economic Instruments was published. The regulation
mandates the establishment of a public service unit (Badan Layanan
Umum/BLU) that will have the authority to manage climate change
funds. Presidential instruction No 77/2018 on Management of En-
vironmental Funds, contains the technical provisions for managing the
BLU although the organizational structure has not yet been determined,
and is awaiting the input of the Minister for Finance. Funding managed
under the BLU may come from national and regional state budgets in
the form of tax and environmental retributions using intergovernmental
fiscal transfers, as well as from other domestic and overseas loans, in-
vestments, or grants. The fund will be channelled to the entities using
the various mechanisms that will eventuate from the UNFCCC nego-
tiations under Article 6, including carbon trading (6.4), and loans,
subsidies, grants and other non-market approaches (6.8).
Over the period of 2006–2014 the country received USD $1.4 billion
from REDD+ contributing Parties, with some commentators estimated
that going forward, the country could receive as much as USD$5.6
billion (Clements et al., 2010; Norman and Nakhooda, 2015). From
2015 to 2016, Indonesia received about USD 1.8 billion in the form of
concessional loans mostly to finance climate change mitigation projects
in energy, transportation and waste sectors, while USD 36.73 million
was received to support mitigation actions mainly in forestry and multi-
sector projects. The financial contribution to the forestry sector ac-
counted for almost 45% of funding. Bilateral sources included Japan
(USD 885.11 million), Germany (USD 213.54 million), and France (USD
124.6 million), while funds mobilized from multilateral funds mainly
came from the Asian Development Bank (USD 403.04 million) and the
Asia Investment Facility (USD 100 million)(MOEF, 2018).
In 2010, Norway alone pledged $1 billion, allocating USD$200 up
front for preparation activities, conditional on a moratorium on con-
version of peat-lands to palm oil (Venter and Koh, 2012). The re-
maining $800 million was due to be paid in 2014, once emissions re-
ductions were verified, but by 2016 the Indonesian government had
still not put in place the requisite reporting mechanisms, leading Nor-
wegian climate minister declaring that he was “impatient to see more
results on the ground” (Jong and Parlina, 2016). Nevertheless, Norway
signed an agreement with Indonesia at the end of 2017 and in early
2019, after a decline in deforestation in 2018, committed to providing
payments, once deforestation reductions were verified. (Ompusunggu,
2017; Taylor, 2019).
The participation of the private sector in emissions reductions was
initially encouraged using ‘nested’ activities at the national, sub-na-
tional, local and project levels (Pedroni et al., 2009). Based on the ex-
isting market-based instrument (MBI) of payments for environmental
services (PES), preliminary ‘pilot’ activities involved a range of interests
including donors, private corporations and non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) while the formal policy negotiations continued to de-
termine what the final model should look like (Kashwan and Holahan,
2014). A range of MBIs promote the transfer of emissions reductions in
participating countries including the emissions trading schemes (ETS)
of Europe and Korea; the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol, the Joint Credit Mechanism (JCM) of Japan, and the
voluntary Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). Carbon taxes have also been
implemented in UK, Chile and Norway as well as result based payment
mechanisms in Japan and Australia. However, countries also have their
own targeted emission reductions to meet their NDC commitments and
the rules for these instruments are still unclear (Goers et al., 2010;
Kreibich and Hermwille, 2018). The implementation of domestic
carbon trading in Indonesia has been a long and challenging discussion.
Tradable emission allowances are a prerequisite for implementation of
domestic carbon trading and have not yet been finalised. Arrangements
that currently exist are still on voluntary basis and the verification
system has not been formalised.
3. Fiscal instruments of forestry sector in Indonesia
Tariffs are the main fiscal instruments used in the forestry sector in
Indonesia (Nurrochmat et al., 2010). According to Indonesian regula-
tions, a tariff refers to charges and fees imposed by the government to
generate revenue, including Non-Tax State Revenue (NTSR). The
dominant sources of revenue are the Reforestation Fund, Forest License
Fee, and the Forest Resource Provision. Conventional taxes also apply
to the forestry sector such as the land and building tax, value added tax
(VAT), and income tax. Government Regulation (GR) No. 12 of 2014
constitutes the legal basis for the imposition of NSTR by the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry (MoEF).
As of 2014, there were thirty-one sources of NTSR in the forestry
sector, centrally formulated by government and administered by MoEF
(PP12/2014, 2014). They take the form of charges on extractive and
non-extractive activities and use of forest infrastructure and services.
They include levies imposed on holders of licenses permitting the use of
forests either for forest conversion to other uses, extractive purposes, or
rehabilitation, as well as for forest and non-forest-oriented business
activities; levies on the exploitation of forests for water and energy
generation, and for the use of infrastructure and forestry services; and
fees imposed from the generation of income from forest and non-forest
products, including tourism, and ecosystem services. In the case of
businesses involved in carbon-related activities, there are also trans-
action fees on carbon sequestration and stocking. The inclusion of
conservation and carbon-related activities under 12/2014 indicates the
government's intention to support a wide range of environment-related
activities, including REDD+, from these charges (Ardiansyah et al.,
2015) although this is still to be fully implemented. Businesses sub-
jected to these charges include state-, private and community en-
terprises engaging in forestry activities. Companies that impact forests,
notably palm oil companies, which are subjected to their own sector
levies, are also included.
The charges may be categorized as follows: 1) levies imposed on the
license holders of forest products and forest area utilization including
the Reforestation Fund and Forest Resource Provision; 2) business li-
cense fees in forestry concession areas (the Forest License Fee); 3) fees
on timber and non-timber forest products, and environmental services;
4) levies from forest area utilization for non-forest purposes; 5) fines; 6)
fees for ecotourism utilization; 7) levies imposed on the utilization of
water and energy; and 8) levies on infrastructure and the provision of
forestry services. Forestry fiscal instruments and policies are under
central government authority, apply nationwide and are implemented
through intergovernmental fiscal transfer (IFT) (Nurfatriani et al.,
2015). The IFT system in Indonesia consists of two channels, grants and
revenue sharing arrangements. A grant consists of general purpose
transfer (DAU - Dana Alokasi Umum) and specific purpose transfer
(DAK- Dana Alokasi Khusus). This system is a consequence of fiscal
decentralization in Indonesia whereby the central government allocates
the budget for implementation to the regional level. Meanwhile a
sharing revenue mechanism is applied through Dana Bagi Hasil (DBH).
According to Law No 33/2004, the general purpose transfer (DAU) is in
the form of a block grant and its use is largely determined by regional
governmental plans regarding administrative costs and servicing public
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needs. The specific purpose transfer (DAK) is allocated to certain dis-
tricts with criteria outlining the activities permitted, relevant to na-
tional priorities. The sharing revenue arrangement (DBH) is sourced
from national revenues generated from natural resources and taxes, and
allocated to local governments based on the percentage the local gov-
ernments have generated (Mumbunan et al., 2012). The most sig-
nificant revenue is generated from the Reforestation Fund or Dana
Reboisasi (DR) and the Forest Resource Provision or Provisi Sumber Daya
Hutan (PSDH), both of which are generated from forest extraction
(Nurfatriani et al., 2018). See Table 1 below for the most significant
revenue from the forestry sector.
Non-tax state revenue has been identified as playing potentially
significant role in emissions reduction, sustainable forest management,
and alleviating poverty in Indonesia. This role is expected to be pro-
vided through the utilization of the fees and charges in forestry sector to
achieve those objectives as stated in national development planning.
When the fees are collected the mechanism of fiscal transfer from the
central to the provincial and district governments ends up rewarding
those districts with the highest rates of deforestation, since payments
are based on the amount of timber extracted not good forest manage-
ment (Nurfatriani et al., 2015). It is exacerbated by the low of aware-
ness from license holders to replant their logged over area. Another
problem with fees and charges in forestry sectors in particular is that
although the conversion of forest to non-forest uses generates revenue
from forest area utilization for non-forest use fee and DR and PSDH if
there is still forest stand on that area, it also reduces the forest estate,
and leads to losses in state revenue from the foregone assets. It has been
calculated that up to 60% of legal timber that could otherwise be sold is
lost, and is encouraging illegal logging as a consequence (Indrarto et al.,
2012).
Other land-use sectors – notably palm oil – have the potential to
create incentives for deforestation (Varkkey et al., 2018). The Crude
Palm Oil (CPO) fund, introduced in 2015 is intended to support sus-
tainable oil palm plantation in Indonesia. According to Presidential
Regulation No 61/2015, the CPO fund was allocated to support the
intensification and better management of smallholders' oil palm plan-
tations (ie to allow for replanting), as well as infrastructure develop-
ment, and industry research. Furthermore, the regulation also per-
mitted the fund to incentivize biodiesel development, expand the
domestic consumption and stimulate downstream processing for other
products. The fund is collected from CPO exporters via the CPO Fund
Management Agency of the Finance Ministry, which collects,
administers, manages, banks, and distributes the fund. Interestingly, the
allocation for supporting biodiesel development is categorized as an
incentive, not a subsidy. With a secondary objective of maintaining the
viability of the palm oil estate with annual plantings of up to
100,000 ha the fund also helps maintain smallholder production
through financing replanting (Anonymous, 2015; Singgih, 2017). This
has been claimed as supporting sustainable palm oil since smallholders
tend to expand their plantation into forest area, the while fund en-
courages intensification in an effort improve productivity and main-
tenance of existing plantations (Nurfatriani et al., 2018).
The oil palm sector in Indonesia plays an important role as a major
contributor to the country's foreign exchange earnings. In 2017 CPO
production reached 37.8 million tons with an export volume of 31
million tons and generated export value of USD 22.97 billion (Mudassir,
2018). However, some literature revealed that in some places there are
still social conflicts due to oil palm cultivation which in the end have
not been able to contribute to poverty alleviation (World-Growth, 2011;
Cahyadi and Waibel, 2016; Krishna et al., 2017; Bou Dib et al., 2018).
There are also expressions of concern that unless fiscal incentives
within the palm oil industry are correctly aligned with activities outside
the sector, such as forest management, oil palm establishment may
increase and result in further loss of high conservation value forest as
well as forest encroachment by local communities. There are several
incentives identified in all stages of the palm oil supply chain including
land access, finance for investment in production, and in CPO produc-
tion. Land access is freed up by formalising land rights, relaxed per-
mitting requirements, and reclassification of lands to enable palm oil
development (UNEP, 2016). Consequently, Indonesia's forests are
challenged by a range of activities that incentivize conversion to non-
forest use and mitigate against emissions reduction.
4. Methods
The research adopted a multi-stage sampling methodology con-
sisting of an online survey followed by in-depth interviews with sta-
keholders. The intention was to follow an actor-centred approach,
gaining a holistic understanding of the complex interdependence of the
issues, and privileging the voices of those engaged in the subject-
matter, rather than simply relying on the literature. Multi-stage sam-
pling is widely used as it reduces populations into smaller groups which
can help address the issue of random sampling from a large cohort. It is
also a cost efficient way of sampling and can be used in resource
Table 1
National fiscal instruments of relevance to forestry sector activities in Indonesia.
Acronym Name English Type
IUPK Ijin Usaha Pemanfaatan Kawasan Forest Area Utilization Permit License
IUPJL Ijin Usaha Pemanfaatan Jasa Lingkungan Environmental Services Utilization Permit License
IUPHHK Ijin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu Commercial Forest Concession License License
IUPHHBK Ijin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Bukan Kayu Non Timber Forest Product Utilization Permit License
IPHHK Izin Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Kayu Commercial Forest Concession License License
IPHHBK Izin Pemungutan Hasil Hutan Bukan Kayu Non Timber Forest Products Utilization Permit License
IPK Ijin Pemanfaatan Kayu Wood Utilization Permit (Land-Clearing) License
IPPKH Izin Pinjam Pakai Kawasan Hutan Forest Estate Temporary Use License License
DR Dana Reboisasi Reforestation Fund Charge
PSDH Provisi Sumber Daya Hutan Forest Resource Provision Charge
IIUPH Iuran Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hutan Forest License Fee Charge
GRT Ganti Rugi Tegakan Sustainability Repayment Charge
DPEH Denda Pelanggaran Eksploitasi Hutan Forest Exploitation Violation Fine Charge
PNBP -PKH Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan Non Tax State Revenue Of Forest Estate User Fee Charge
PNT Penggantian Nilai Tegakan Stumpage Value Replacement Fee Charge
PNBP Karbon Transaksi Kegiatan Penyerapan Dan Atau Penyimpanan Karbon Dari
Kawasan Hutan
Non Tax State Revenue Transaction Activity Of Carbon Absorption and/or
Storage From Forest Area
Charge
PPh Pajak Penghasilan Income Tax Tax
PPn Pajak Pertambahan Nilai Value Added Tax Tax
PBB Pajak Bumi Bangunan Land And Building Tax In Forestry Sector Tax
(KPK, 2015; Nurfatriani et al., 2018). Note: PPh, PPn and PBB are taxes, which means they are not technically NTSR as stipulated in PP 12/2014.
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constrained environments (Jelsma et al., 2017; Maraseni et al., 2019).
4.1. Online survey
An online survey of Indonesian stakeholders was deployed between
April 2016 and October 2017 to determine perceptions regarding the
effectiveness of fiscal instruments for reducing forest-based emissions.
Respondents were asked self-identify their sector/group. A total of fifty-
four participated in the survey and identified themselves as government
(22), forestry sector (13), Education/research (14), and ‘Other’ (5).
‘Other’ was comprised of respondents identifying as NGO/civil society
(3) and climate-change related consultants (2). ‘Forestry sector’ in-
cluded six respondents who identified as ‘primary industry’, five as
‘business’ and two as simply ‘forest industry’. They were from large,
medium and small enterprises serving domestic and international
markets, and were active in native forests and plantations, supplying
round wood and pulpwood, as well as being engaged in sawmilling
(Table 2).
Respondents were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of a range of
fiscal instruments (Table 4), using a five-point Likert scale, in which
points one and two were ‘very ineffective’ and ‘ineffective’, point three
was neutral (‘neither effective not ineffective’) and points four and five
were ‘effective’ and ‘very effective’. The types of instrument are de-
scribed in Table 3. The collected data were used to determine effec-
tiveness by means of a weighted average score, whereby the total
number of responses for each point on the scale were multiplied by the
total number of responses on that point of the scale, and divided by the
total number of respondents.
4.2. Stakeholder interviews
Survey respondents were also asked if they were willing to to be
interviewed. Of the fifty-four respondents, thirty-five agreed to be in-
terviewed. In-depth interviews lasted approximately one hour and were
conducted in Jakarta and Bogor between April and October 2017.
Interviews were largely focused on, but not limited to: effectiveness of
different fiscal instruments; impacts of palm oil subsidies; policy un-
certainties within SFM and REDD+; vertical and horizontal co-ordi-
nation and collaborations between different governments and non-
governmental organizations; land-use governance; and benefit sharing
mechanisms. Interviewees were from government (12), forestry sector
(9), education/research (4), and ‘other’ (10). ‘Other’ was comprised of
respondents identifying as ‘Carbon stock and storage concession holder’
(1), Ecosystem restoration concession holder (2), NGO – international
(3) NGO – national (2), and Palm oil concession holder (2).
Ethics approval was sought and obtained before commencing the
field study (Griffith University Protocol no: 2016/216).
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Results from online survey
As noted, survey participants were asked to identify which fiscal
instruments they thought were most effective in reducing emissions. In
general, government, education/research and ‘other’ identified in-
centives as the most effective. It should be noted that the forestry sector
identified ‘other’ forms of instrument as being the most effective, fol-
lowed by incentives and taxes. Why this was the case is difficult to
determine, but it may show a desire in this sector to pursue avenues
other than charges and taxes to reduce emissions.
A smaller sub-set (33) expressed a view as to whether current fiscal
instruments actually encouraged or discouraged deforestation and de-
gradation, with a small majority (55%) expressing the view that they
encouraged them (Table 4). Those who thought they encouraged de-
forestation and degradation (15) were asked to specify to which in-
struments they were referring; the answers being: charges (4), notably
PSDH and DR; subsidies (4), particularly for those in the palm oil sector,
and for fertilizer; license- and permit fees (3) including IPPKH for forest
conversion; intergovernmental fiscal transfers (2); and taxes – value
added tax and export tax (2) (Table 5).
5.2. Results from stakeholders' interviews
Interviewees provided useful information on options for fiscal in-
struments to promote private sector engagement in REDD+ and iden-
tified issues impacting on the ability of forest sector enterprises to un-
dertake activities that would lead to emissions reductions. Interviews
Table 2
Breakdown of interview subjects by sector.
Respondents Characteristics N %
Government 22 40








Type of fiscal instruments Definition
Taxes Levies imposed by the government on taxpayers without direct benefit that can be directly appointed.
Tradable permits Fiscal instruments aimed at reducing pollution. A maximum permissible emission rate is determined by government and permits that allow for the
production of a maximum emission are issued to industry players. These permits can subsequently be traded to firms that require more permits in
order to continue their activities.
Subsidies Fiscal instruments that aim to improve people's welfare by reducing the government's role significantly in economic activities, so that the government
which acts as a regulator deserves to execute subsidies for the economic sector that concern the lives of many people
Tariffs Levies imposed by the government and must be paid by taxpayers or the public for the goods or services provided by the government that can be
directly appointed
VAT/excise duty Tax imposed on each value added of goods or services in distribution chain from producers to consumers. It is a type of consumption tax
Incentives As policy instruments in the context that they are important for influencing and cultivating the implementation of policy objectives
(Comerford, 2004; Suparmoko and Nurrochmat, 2006; Yustika, 2008)
Table 4
Views on the effectiveness of fiscal instruments directed at the private sector/
businesses in reducing emissions (rating out of 5).
Government Forestry sector Education/research Other
Taxes 2.71 3.33 2.86 2.75
Tradable permits 2.29 3.00 2.71 2.75
Subsidies 2.81 2.33 3.00 2.25
Tariffs 2.53 3.17 3.43 2.5
VAT/excise duty 2.80 2.83 3.14 1.75
Incentives 3.24 3.33 3.50 3.25
Other 2.67 4.00 1.00 NA
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revealed the damaging nature of competition between native forests
and planted forests, and between both forest types in comparison to
palm oil plantations, as a result of the timber export ban and subsidies
to palm oil production. The significance of palm oil as a business ac-
tivity also encouraged local community encroachment into forests.
Fees, charges and funds levied on the forest sector did not meet the
objectives, for which they were established. In addition, high fees, as
well as informal charges, all acted as constraints on the viability of the
extractive and non-extractive forest sectors. There was also a lack of
policy clarity around the relationship between SFM and REDD+, and
between REDD+ and broader carbon policy, which in turn was im-
peded by a high degree of uncertainty.
From an options-oriented standpoint, interviewees demonstrated a
desire for greater coordination of land use practices (native and plan-
tation forestry, and palm oil); more collaboration between forest users –
notably extractive and non-extractive forest enterprises and local
community smallholders; more flexibility in the paying of fees and
approaches that might be adopted for paying fees, as well as the need
for greater emphasis on incentives; and the creation of closer linkages
between SFM, REDD+ and Indonesia's broader international carbon
policy negotiations under UNFCCC. These perspectives are reproduced
in more detail in the results section below.
5.2.1. Impacts of palm oil incentives
Oil palm concession holders revealed the existence of incentives to
maintain the price of palm oil via production of biodiesel during per-
iods of oversupply. The consequence of the incentive was that the
supply of crude palm oil (CPO) was reduced because it was used for
biodiesel: demand remained, so the prices rose. CPO producers sold the
biodiesel to State Owned Oil and Gas Company (Pertamina). Under this
programme, approximately 3 million kilolitres of CPO was burnt as
biodiesel in 2016, under the twin justification of maintaining price
stability, and preventing carbon emissions. The production of biodiesel
had also been incentivized to the sum of around IDP 5000 a litre
through the fund. One respondent stated that this incentive was ulti-
mately “charged to consumers”. Another interviewee explained that
incentives acted as a “trigger [to] forest encroachment due to palm oil
plantation expansion” – a view shared by a second interviewee who
explained that “smallholders and local community” were responsible
for “encroaching forest areas” as well as seeking to “convert their forest
into a palm oil plantation.”
According to one plantation forest concession holder representative
whose company was growing sawlogs, it was “very difficult…to com-
pete with palm oil”, because palm oil was grown on “shorter rotations”,
implying that there was a direct competition between forest and palm
oil plantations in terms of options for revenue generation. A re-
presentative from another plantation pulpwood company explained
how palm oil “has been declared a priority industry by the government,
because of the perceived benefits” which made it more economically
attractive than forestry. According to themthey had to pay the Forest
Resources Provision (PSDH) every time they harvested the trees. It was
different “with the oil palm, they take the fruit, but they don't have to
pay the tax, because they just take the fruit” (i.e. not the palmtree it-
self). In addition, forest companies came under a different ministry
(MoEF) from palm oil and were obliged to follow its ten-year and an-
nual plans. Palm oil on the other hand was under the Ministry of
Agriculture, and it did not require such planning cycles. This led them
to observe that, taken together, “this acts as an incentive for oil palm
conversion.” One NGO interviewee concluded that because
Government had “declared [palm oil] a priority industry, because of the
perceived benefits”, it had become “number one” with harvesting from
native forests “a far distant third.”
5.2.2. Effectiveness of fees, charges and funds levied on forest sector
Holders of forest concessions, whether they were for wood pro-
duction, or other purposes such as restoration or carbon sequestration,
questioned the effectiveness of the fees and charges currently in ex-
istence in the forestry sector. According to two interviewees, the re-
forestation fund (DR), (designed specifically to finance reforestation
and forest rehabilitation) had been used to finance research and de-
velopment in the aviation sector (although this had been in the ‘eighties
some years before). One of them (Education/Research) saw this as
evidence that DR “has been misused.” The second (Other, Certifier) also
considered this inappropriate and argued: “the fees should go back to
the forest.” One NGO, with long-term experience of the fund saw the
non-return of funds a “problem.” Concession holders “felt they no
longer had responsibility to the forest, as they had already paid.”
Because the funds “did not go back from the government to re-
habilitation” concessionaires did not undertake reforestation. This
perspective was echoed by one of the natural forest concession holders.
The company had to pay the government once the trees were cut, “but
in reality, the rehabilitation fund is not used for replanting the area, but
rather for other purposes – by the government.” As a result, the forest
was “not of good quality.”2 Another NGO argued the “primary aim” of
the instruments was to “generate revenue”, and asked: “is the revenue
influencing people's behaviour, and benefitting them? The answer
really is no.” Concerning the Forest Estate Temporary Use License
(IPPKH), one government respondent (MoEF) was concerned that the
revenue derived from this charge “has not been used for forest activ-
ities; it is now in the state treasury, but we still have not done anything
with it.” One of the Ministry of Finance interviewees provided an ex-
planation suggesting that: “the logic may also be that because this is
‘non-forest money’ it should not go back to the Forest Ministry.”3
Forest sector interviewees universally complained about the level of
fees and taxes, whether they were natural forest, plantation, ecosystem
restoration, or carbon concession holders. One plantation concession
holder pleaded for the government to “simplify the fees and reduce the
costs.” They also complained about “double counting” as a consequence
of paying fees to the central and provincial governments. This led them
to conclude there were “disincentives everywhere: from the market [log
export, ed.] ban, and from the operations' fees and charges.”
For one of the non-extractive ecological concession (ERC) holders
the current fee-paying structure was “not adapted to this new regime”
of emissions reduction. For them up front fees were a “fiscal disin-
centive.” Forestry concessions realised an up-front benefit from logging
but they only realised their assets in the future, which they found
frustrating because “we are not leading to emissions – we are reducing
emissions.”
The other significant issue commented on by interviewees were the
unofficial or informal fees, which they were obliged to pay. These
ranged from being quasi-legal to illegal, and were usually in the form of
stumpage, ranging from USD$1 to $10 per cubic metre, depending on
Table 5
Views on whether current fiscal instruments encourage or discourage defor-




Encourage (18) 10 (56%) 3 (43%) 3 (60%) 2 (50%)
Discourage (15) 7 (41%) 4 (57%) 2 (40%) 2 (50%)
Total (33) 17 (100%) 7 (100%) 5 (100% 3 (100%)
2 This perception appears to demonstrate that the interviewee presumed that
since they had already paid the fees and charges, reforestation was the gov-
ernment's responsibility.
3 This appears to contradict government regulations stipulating that DR rev-
enue be earmarked for financing forestry activities, implying that other fees not
specifically designated for forest activities are being incorporated into NTSR.
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the market value of the timber. As one plantation concessionaire ex-
plained, “We pay stumpage to the local community – USD$2 per cube.
Paying stumpage is illegal, but if we don't pay, we cannot operate. The
cost differs across communities and forest types, but the pattern is the
same. It is a hidden cost.” This led one natural concession holder to
comment that “the profit that could be made from the business” as a
consequence was “not much higher” than cost of the wood itself.
5.2.3. SFM, REDD+ and carbon policy uncertainties
There was confusion among interviewees about the nature of the
relationship between the Paris Agreement, SFM and REDD+, and
carbon policy generally. Opinions were split as to whether REDD+ was
subordinate to SFM, or the other way around. One plantation con-
cessionaire argued “if a company applies SFM, they are already enga-
ging in reductions, so REDD+ should be seen as an SFM management
activity.” Another interviewee (MoEF) agreed, arguing that SFM reg-
ulations were “well established”, but REDD+ did not have “the same
level of regulations”; consequently “SFM should lead REDD.” In addi-
tion, the urgency of conserving forests was more compelling. On that
basis “REDD should revert to SFM principles, rather than emissions
reduction.” However, one NGO was critical of the role SFM had played
in the emissions reduction debate. According them “more than ten
years” had been lost “because of misconceptions.” They argued that
REDD+ was “more advanced” than SFM “on methodologies.” SFM was
“very subjective in terms of measurements, depending on the experts.”
Confusion may be attributable to the fact that certain forest manage-
ment practices could be seen as relevant to both, notably reduced im-
pact logging (RIL). One natural forest concession holder noted that they
“have already implemented reduced impact logging, but only for SFM.”
Another natural and plantations concessions holder also stated that
they were “interested and willing” to implement RIL. They knew they
could “reduce emissions by forty per cent”, but the problem with REDD
was the results-based payment system, “because this comes at the end.”
Various interviewees also commented on the lack of clarity in
carbon policy. Several government interviewees, all from MoEF, ex-
pressed concerns. One was of the view that there was “no clear support,
and no clear policy for carbon” as well as “no clear market”, or gui-
dance on “how programmes will be managed.” In their absence, they
thought, that: “the interest will disappear”, except for “some companies
that have good connection to international donors and markets.”
Another government interviewee acknowledged that there were “min-
isterial regulations for carbon companies” in planted forests, however
they were largely focussed on “only technical issues on how to apply for
a concession, etc., but nothing in relation to fiscal instrument policy.”
With “no published government policy for carbon markets” it was “hard
to sell the carbon.” This same interviewee noted that beyond carbon
market incentives there were nevertheless “incentives for carbon in
production forests” in the form of ecosystem services, such as water,
eco-tourism, and so forth. They also noted that even though many of
these activities had been certified by companies through schemes such
as Voluntary Carbon Standards (VCS), they were no longer able to “sell
or trade” their carbon credits due to the collapse of the voluntary
carbon market, and policy uncertainty on account of the evolving in-
tergovernmental negotiations. As there was an existing demand for non-
timber forest products, such as honey, many companies were simply
“focused on supplying conventional [non-carbon] domestic markets.”
The major problem for REDD+ from a governmental policy per-
spective, as explained by a MoEF representative was that “the context is
different now, especially given market issues, which are now less re-
levant, because Paris is focused on results-based payments.” According
to another (Environment/Research) the change in emphasis had shifted
REDD+ from being “market driven” to a mechanism that was now
“becoming policy driven.” They were of the view that “carbon markets
have not worked”, because “our current policy is not linked to mar-
kets.” This was compounded by the “further problem” that any emis-
sions reductions would now go to achieving “Our domestic NDC
targets.” This meant there was “no money internationally” because
emissions reductions were “buyer driven” and now “the demand is not
there.”
5.2.4. Co-ordination of land-use governance and benefit sharing
Several interviewees spoke of the need to better coordinate land use
practices. This was clearly expressed by one of the Education/Research
participants, who argued that Indonesia had to have “effective in-
tegrated land use policy, and authority.” At present land use was split
between MoEF (approx. 130 million ha) and the National Land Agency,
BPN (approx. 60 million ha), making integration “very difficult”, and
posing a “practical problem” around getting permission, because “land
is often registered under the wrong agency.” Other Ministries were also
impacted by MoEF activities, including fisheries, tourism, and small to
medium enterprise. This interviewee wanted to see them all work to-
gether “to develop local economics so that [the] local community will
not do encroachment and illegal logging for their livelihood.” One li-
censeholder of an ecological restoration concession (ERC) pointed to
divisions within the ministries themselves as a problem. They singled
out the production, conservation, plantation, forest conversion and
climate change directorates in MoEF, referring to them as “interests”
that “need to be co-ordinated” both internally and in their dealings with
the Ministry of Finance.
One natural forest logging concession holder noted further, that:
“Other ministries also impact on the forest sector, especially the
Industry ministry. It tends to look at the downstream industries and
overlook the upstream companies.” A palm oil concessionaire agreed,
explaining there were “community palm oil plantations in the forest
area.” This created a problem for the “forestry sector in the upstream
side” because it wanted to “prevent forest encroachment to avoid the
forest conversion into palm oil”, but the sector had to “overcome the
palm oil estates that now already exist in the forest area.”
Concerns were also expressed about the forest management unit
(FMU) system. One natural forest/plantation concession holder com-
mented that everything was “still very unclear, especially what the role
of private institutions will be”, and secondly “the role of local and
district agencies (forest services, etc.).” The transfer of administrative
authority from the provincial to the district level needed “to be clar-
ified…at the moment, they are still in competition; these issues are
interconnected.”
A number of interviewees were aware of the need for greater col-
laboration between all stakeholders for better forest governance, from
the ministries, down to the communities. One government interviewee
(MoEF) identified “problems with land tenure as there are no clear
boundaries, and this results in encroachment” which is “perpetuated in
the absence of collaboration around zoning.” Another plantation con-
cession holder noted that they were involved in “collaboration with
society to support the Adats”, but it was “limited”, partly because local
communities still needed “to prepare their land claims, as tenure is still
unclear.” Another government interviewee (MoEF) also noted that
while there was “a regulation and decree which requires companies to
collaborate with local people to develop the programme”, there was
“nothing specified in relation to capacity building, just about the need
for partnership.” Interestingly, despite the opinion of one MoEF inter-
viewee that “local benefit sharing…is a company matter; it is not a
ministry requirement”, forest sector and palm oil interviewees were
unanimous that government should specify arrangements for benefit
sharing and include them within the relevant fiscal instruments. One
plantation concession holder was of the view that “aside from the
company, the local people around the forestland should benefit”, but
that how this occurred “should be covered in the instrument.”
It was also noted that there was a greater need for greater intra-
sectoral collaboration across the forest industry. One plantation con-
cession holder indicated that they would like to “collaborate over the
longer term” with the larger pulp and paper companies but the com-
panies they might work with needed “to provide the incentive” for them
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to do so. The problem was that as smaller, plantation-based enterprises
they had “no bargaining position” and were “powerless in negotiations
with the big players in this limited market.” Once relations between the
large and small companies were “more fair…then we would be happy
to integrate downstream and upstream processing.”
5.2.5. More effective fiscal instruments
Interviewees also provided useful information as to how fiscal in-
struments could be used to promote private sector engagement in REDD
+, and also identified barriers to forest sector enterprises undertaking
activities that would lead to emissions reductions. Their comments re-
vealed the damaging nature of competition between native forests and
planted forests, and between both forest types in comparison to palm oil
plantations, arising from the timber export ban and subsidies to palm
oil production. Several noted how the economic value of palm oil en-
couraged local community encroachment into forests. In addition, in-
terviewees were of the view that fees, charges and funds levied on the
forest sector did not meet the objectives, for which they were estab-
lished. In addition, high fees, as well as informal charges, acted as
constraints on the viability of the forest industries (both loggin and non-
extractive). Finally, interviewees also noted there was a lack of policy
clarity around the relationship between SFM and REDD+, and between
REDD+ and broader carbon policy, which resulted in a high degree of
uncertainty.
All concession holders, whether engaging in logging or other non-
extractive activities, made a number of suggestions as to how to make
fees and charges work more effectively. Some suggestions were rela-
tively simple, with one representative from a large pulp and paper
company suggesting there should be “a scale of fees dependent on the
type of land (natural forest or degraded).” One plantation timber con-
cessionaire thought that: “government should reduce fees to encourage
business.” Another plantation timber concession representative wanted
to develop a range of activities but felt constrained by existing fee
structures. This concession holder wanted to get involved in ecological
restoration, but thought that there should be a difference in license fees
between extractive and non-extractive activities:
The arrangements for the two concessions should be different, but
the arrangements at present are the same. The bank guarantees are
required for both. In the future it would be better to get the license
before we pay the fees. It should be less complicated for the ERC than
plantations, especially because we do not know what is going to happen
with the carbon, but the government has the same system for both.
One logging concessionaire active in natural forests put forward the
idea, that if the government financed companies to replant harvested
areas it would be able to “take larger fees for the rehabilitation fund”
the next time the area was harvested. Their logic was that government
support for silviculture would lead to “optimised rehabilitation.”
Companies were financially constrained and did not do undertake ef-
fective rehabilitation “because of the current conditions in the forest
sector, as there is not enough liquidity.” Government support would
ultimately result in “more and larger trees for harvest” in the future.
One Education/Research academic was of the view that the current
system did not “give incentive” to “green business.” They wanted the
central government to “adjust the formula” of fiscal transfers “by in-
tegrating the sustainability index of the natural resources managed.”
They suggested, that: “if we extract a certain amount of logs, and we cut
the trees more than we should, there should be a penalty.”
One of the oil palm concessionaires wanted to see incentives “to
avoid deforestation”, including “funds for social and economic devel-
opment” but in addition “the government should develop law en-
forcement.” One NGO supported this view, arguing the only regulations
the industry currently followed were “technical only.” Their suggestion
was to link “fiscal incentives” to more stringent “regulatory enforce-
ment” and “compliance audits.”
Although tax relief was seen as important by a number of conces-
sions holders, there were other approaches. One natural forest/
plantation interviewee thought the government should “simplify reg-
ulation”; “less taxes” and “more transparency” were “helpful.” This
would make business “more efficient” and “that would work as well.”
5.2.6. Better policy linkages
A number of interviewees commented that emissions reduction ac-
tivities needed to be integrated with existing management activities and
linked to markets, with clear leadership from government. However,
several interviewees argued emissions reduction activities could not
occur in the absence of a carbon market, whatever the post-Paris ar-
rangements were. According to a MoEF interviewee “a domestic carbon
market”, meant Indonesia could “manage the projects that deal with the
existing voluntary schemes through a domestic emissions trading
scheme.” A number of concessionaires agreed, with one adding: “the
idea of a national carbon market is not a bad idea, it depends how it is
designed.” Rather than creating special pilot areas, REDD+ should be
applied in existing forest management areas. According to another
Education/Research interviewee it should be “implemented in pro-
duction forest management…through [the] additionality concept” (i.e.
ensuring emissions reductions would not otherwise have occurred
without REDD+). One plantation concessionaire suggested REDD+
needed to be integrated with other management activities, including
non-timber forest products as well as logs, and this should be allowed to
happen: “concurrently.” It was not possible at the moment because
there were “disincentives everywhere”, ranging from the excessive
number of fees and charges, through to the log export ban, and the
“timber oligopolies.” According to one natural forest/plantation con-
cession holder, encroachment was more attractive to local commu-
nities, and REDD+ needed to become “an economic activity…and
thereby avoiding deforestation and degradation.” Finally, another NGO
recommended that there should be “alignment of REDD financing” with
the “governmental annual budget…and fiscal policies and incentives/
disincentives” This would ensure the country did not have “budgets
inconsistent with REDD goals (e.g. finance to protect forest and finance
to cut forest).”
6. Conclusions
Indonesia faces many hurdles in its efforts to reduce forest-based
emissions. Forgoing the contributions to the domestic economy from
activities that impact negatively on forests – including the revenue that
such activities bring in in terms of taxes and charges – is not easy.
Initiating alternative governance arrangements, when provincial and
district governments benefit from the redistribution of this revenue
makes it all the more difficult. Creating viable alternative land-use in-
centives to business-as-usual practices in such a decentralized, high-
emitting, tropical forest country context therefore has considerable
relevance for other developing countries seeking to combat deforesta-
tion, and climate change. Although REDD+ has not yet been fully
implemented in Indonesia, commentators view it as an effective in-
centive mechanism to address these challenges, by channeling inter-
national donor investments from high-emitting developed counties
seeking to reduce their own emissions, by providing forest stakeholders
with social, environmental and financial benefits, while making re-es-
tablishment and reforestation more cost effective. However, different
stakeholders benefit from different types of incentives, such as tax re-
lief, carbon trading or alternative investment activities. As a result,
there is no single mechanism that can be applied, since landholders,
such as local communities, are not always the same as those wishing to
develop forests, such as forestry companies. In addition, governmental
policy objectives, whether they be poverty alleviation, social equality or
environmental sustainability will also affect the types of incentives
used. In short, a mix of fiscal instruments is required to meet govern-
mental objectives, and stakeholder needs in response to those objec-
tives.
This paper has investigated the diverse perspectives and agendas of
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government, forest and palm oil industries, and other stakeholders, on
the role of fiscal incentives in encouraging the participation of the
private sector to reduce forest-based emissions in Indonesia. In the
qualitative survey conducted during the course of the research, it ap-
pears that while a broad suite of stakeholders (government, education/
research and others) prefer incentives above other forms of fiscal in-
strument, the forestry (i.e. logging) sector was less convinced. Surveyed
respondents were also divided as to whether current fiscal instruments
encouraged or discouraged deforestation. It is perhaps worth noting
that the two primary non-tax instruments used in the forestry sector,
PSDH and DR were not seen as effective, and that DR was not viewed as
fulfilling its intended objective of restoring forests. From an options-
oriented standpoint, interviewees demonstrated: a desire for greater
coordination of land use practices (native and plantation forestry, and
palm oil); more collaboration between forest users – notably extractive
and non-extractive forest enterprises and local community small-
holders; more flexibility in the paying of fees, approaches that might be
adopted, and greater emphasis on incentives; and the creation of closer
linkages between SFM, REDD+ and Indonesia's broader international
carbon policy negotiations under UNFCCC.
What the research furthers suggests is that there is a need for greater
law enforcement and coordination of land use practices to conform with
existing spatial planning. This would positively impact forest-based
emissions in Indonesia (whether native and plantation forestry, or palm
oil cultivation). Fiscal incentives should encourage land managers to
follow spatial planning requirements. Fiscal incentives should therefore
be directed to securing formal land tenure, and reducing the expansion
into forest areas where tenure is currently unclear. A further incentive
would be the deduction of land and building tax for license holders who
maintain and manage high conservation value (HCV) areas within their
concessions; something that is not done at the moment.
Such measures would be further enhanced by increasing the colla-
boration between forest users, notably forest enterprises and local
community smallholders. A more actor-centred model, combining
public policy with market incentives in a hybrid state and non-state
system integrating civil society business within supply chains may re-
present a better method than the current ‘top-down’ state-centric ap-
proach. This would also provide ‘horizontal’ benefits by improving re-
lations between actors and strengthening the power of local
communities.
On a governmental level, closer linkages need to be forged between
SFM, REDD+ and climate policy. In combination, these measures have
the potential to enhance the business prospects for the sustainable use
and management of Indonesia's forests, whilst reducing emissions and
creating more certainty in national climate policy. The adoption of
practical and context-based approaches would contribute to the overall
aim of supporting the development of institutional arrangements and
fiscal mechanisms for effective implementation of REDD+ within and
among various levels of government as well as ensuring that business
and industry benefits from emissions reduction activities in Indonesia.
Acknowledgements
The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from
the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (FST/
2012/040). The authors thank the reviewers for providing helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
Declaration of competing interests
None.
References
Abram, N.K., MacMillan, D.C., Xofis, P., Ancrenaz, M., Tzanopoulos, J., Ong, R.,
Goossens, B., Koh, L.P., Del Valle, C., Peter, L., Morel, A.C., Lackman, I., Chung, R.,
Kler, H., Ambu, L., Baya, W., Knight, A.T., 2016. Identifying where REDD+ finan-
cially out-competes oil palm in floodplain landscapes using a fine-scale approach.
PLoS ONE 11 (6), 1–23.
Anonymous, 2015. Disbursement of CPO funds ready to spur industry. In: The Jakarta
Post.
Ardiansyah, F., Marthen, A.A., Amalia, N., 2015. Forest and Land-Use Governance in a
Decentralized Indonesia: A Legal and Policy Review. CIFOR.
Bou Dib, J., Alamsyah, Z., Qaim, M., 2018. Land-use change and income inequality in
rural Indonesia. Forest Policy Econ. 94, 55–66.
Cahyadi, E.R., Waibel, H., 2016. Contract farming and vulnerability to poverty among oil
palm smallholders in Indonesia. J. Dev. Stud. 52 (5), 681–695.
Chokkalingam, U., Vanniarachchy, A., 2011. Sri Lanka's REDD+ Potential, Myth Or
Reality? Forest Carbon Asia Colombo.
Clements, G.R., Sayer, J., Boedhihartono, A.K., Venter, O., Lovejoy, T., Koh, L.P.,
Laurance, W.F., 2010. Cautious optimism over Norway−Indonesia REDD pact.
Conserv. Biol. 24 (6), 1437–1438.
Comerford, E., 2004. Choosing between Incentive Mechanisms for Natural Resource
Management: A Practical Guide for Regional NRM Bodies in Queensland.
DJPPI, 2017. Menuju Operasionalisasi Pendanaan Iklim. Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup
dan Kehutanan. http://km.reddplusid.org/d/
e9a53d0ed1816293ef24647c7b33d819, Accessed date: 3 June 2019.
Fay, C., Denduangrudee, H.-M.S., 2018. An Uneven Path Toward Rights and REDD+ in
Indonesia.
Glynn, P.J., Cadman, T., Maraseni, T.N., 2017. Business, Organized Labour and Climate
Policy: Forging a Role at the Negotiating Table. Edward Elgar Publishing,
Cheltenham.
Goers, S.R., Wagner, A.F., Wegmayr, J., 2010. New and old market-based instruments for
climate change policy. Environ. Econ. Policy Stud. 12 (1–2), 1–30.
Hein, J., Guarin, A., Frommé, E., Pauw, P., 2018. Deforestation and the Paris climate
agreement: an assessment of REDD+ in the national climate action plans. Forest
Policy Econ. 90, 7–11.
Henderson, I., Coello, J., Fischer, R., Mulder, I., Christophersen, T., 2013. The role of the
private sector in REDD+: the case for engagement and options for intervention. UN-
REDD Programme Policy Brief 4, 1–12 (Web: www. un-redd. org).
Indrarto, G.B., Murharjanti, P., Khatarina, J., Pulungan, I., Ivalerina, F., Rahman, J.,
Prana, M.N., Resosudarmo, I.A.P., Muharrom, E., 2012. The Context of REDD+ in
Indonesia: Drivers, Agents and Institutions. Cifor.
Irawan, S., Tacconi, L., Ring, I., 2013. Stakeholders' incentives for land-use change and
REDD plus: the case of Indonesia. Ecol. Econ. 87, 75–83.
Irawan, S., Tacconi, L., Ring, I., 2014. Designing intergovernmental fiscal transfers for
conservation: the case of REDD plus revenue distribution to local governments in
Indonesia. Land Use Policy 36, 47–59.
Jelsma, I., Schoneveld, G.C., Zoomers, A., van Westen, A.C.M., 2017. Unpacking
Indonesia's independent oil palm smallholders: an actor-disaggregated approach to
identifying environmental and social performance challenges. Land Use Policy 69,
281–297.
Jong, H.N., Parlina, I., 2016. Norway slams slow REDD+ project progress. In: The Jakarta
Post.
Kashwan, P., Holahan, R., 2014. Nested governance for effective REDD+: institutional
and political arguments.
Khatri, D.B., Marquardt, K., Pain, A., Ojha, H., 2018. Shifting regimes of management and
uses of forests: what might REDD+ implementation mean for community forestry?
Evidence from Nepal. Forest Policy Econ. 92, 1–10.
KPK, 2015. Preventing State Losses in Indonesia's Forestry Sector: An Analysis of Non-tax
Forest Revenue Collection and Timber Production Administration.
Kreibich, N., Hermwille, L., 2018. Carbon Pricing: Using Market-Based Mechanisms to
Mitigate Climate Change.
Krishna, V., Euler, M., Siregar, H., Qaim, M., 2017. Differential livelihood impacts of oil
palm expansion in Indonesia. Agric. Econ. 48 (5), 639–653.
Leonard, S., 2017. Analysis: Getting down to business in Bonn. In: Forest News, . https://
forestsnews.cifor.org/49709/getting-down-to-business-in-bonn?fnl=en (Accessed
07/03/2019).
Maraseni, T.N., Bhattarai, N., Karky, B.S., Cadman, T., Timalsina, N., Bhandari, T.S.,
Apan, A., Ma, H.O., Rawat, R., Verma, N., 2019. An assessment of governance quality
for community-based forest management systems in Asia: prioritisation of govern-
ance indicators at various scales. Land Use Policy 81, 750–761.
Mbatu, R.S., 2015. Domestic and international forest regime nexus in Cameroon: an as-
sessment of the effectiveness of REDD+ policy design strategy in the context of the
climate change regime. Forest Policy Econ. 52, 46–56.
Mbatu, R.S., 2016. REDD+ research: reviewing the literature, limitations and ways for-
ward. Forest Policy Econ. 73, 140–152.
MOEF, 2018. Indonesia second biennial update report. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/
files/resource/Indonesia-2nd_BUR.pdf, Accessed date: 3 June 2019.
Mudassir, R., 2018. Kinerja Minyak Sawit Mentah: Ekspor CPO naik 21% https://
kalimantan.bisnis.com/read/20180130/12/732167/kinerja-minyak-sawit-mentah-
ekspor-cpo-naik-21, Accessed date: 3 July 2019.
Mumbunan, S., Ring, I., Lenk, T., 2012. Ecological Fiscal Transfers at the Provincial Level
in Indonesia. UFZ-Diskussionspapiere.
Nielsen, T.D., 2016. From REDD+ forests to green landscapes? Analyzing the emerging
integrated landscape approach discourse in the UNFCCC. Forest Policy Econ. 73,
177–184.
Norman, M., Nakhooda, S., 2015. The state of REDD+ finance. In: GCD Working Paper.
Centre for Global Development, Washington.
Nurfatriani, F., Darusman, D., Nurrochmat, D.R., Yustika, A.E., Muttaqin, M.Z., 2015.
Redesigning Indonesian forest fiscal policy to support forest conservation. Forest
Policy Econ. 61, 39–50.
T. Cadman, et al. Forest Policy and Economics 108 (2019) 101913
9
Nurfatriani, F., Salminah, M., Cadman, T., Sarker, T., 2018. Incentives and disincentives
for reducing emissions under REDD+ in Indonesia. In: Pathways to a Sustainable
Economy. Springer, pp. 191–207.
Nurrochmat, D.R., Solihin, I., Ekayani, M., Hadianto, A.d., 2010. Neraca Pembangunan
Hijau-Konsep dan Implikasi Bisnis Karbon dan Tata Air di Sektor Kehutanan.
(Bogor).
Ompusunggu, M., 2017. Indonesia’s REDD+ begins new chapter. The Jakarta Post.
Pedroni, L., Dutschke, M., Streck, C., Porrua, M.E., 2009. Creating incentives for avoiding
further deforestation: the nested approach. Clim. Pol. 9 (2), 207–220.
PP12/2014, 2014. Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 12 Tahun 2014
Tentang Jenis Dan Tarif Atas Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berlaku
Pada Kementerian Kehutanan. (http://www.anggaran.depkeu.go.id/peraturan/
PP12 2014 Tarif PNBP Deptan.pdf Accessed 04/03/2018).
Purnomo, H., Shantiko, B., Sitorus, S., Gunawan, H., Achdiawan, R., Kartodihardjo, H.,
Dewayani, A.A., 2017. Fire economy and actor network of forest and land fires in
Indonesia. Forest Policy Econ. 78, 21–31.
Roessing Neto, E., 2015. REDD+ as a tool of global forest governance. Int. Spectator 50
(1), 60–73.
Sahide, M.A.K., Maryudi, A., Supratman, S., Giessen, L., 2016. Is Indonesia utilising its
international partners? The driving forces behind Forest management units. Forest
Policy Econ. 69, 11–20.
Saito-Jensen, M., Rutt, R.L., Chhetri, B.B.K., 2014. Social and environmental tensions:
affirmative measures under REDD+ carbon payment initiatives in Nepal. Hum. Ecol.
42 (5), 683–694.
Sheng, J., Zhou, W., de Sherbinin, A., 2018. Uncertainty in estimates, incentives, and
emission reductions in REDD+ projects. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 15 (7),
1544.
Simamora, A., 2008. Govt to set up climate trust fund to woo donors. In: The Jakarta Post.
Indonesia's CPO levy collector mulls endowment fund for sustainability. In: Singgih, V.P.
(Ed.), The Jakarta Post, Niskala Media Tenggara.
Somorin, O.A., Visseren-Hamakers, I.J., Arts, B., Sonwa, D.J., Tiani, A.-M., 2014. REDD+
policy strategy in Cameroon: actors, institutions and governance. Environ. Sci. Pol.
35, 87–97.
Suparmoko, M., Nurrochmat, D.R., 2006. Prospek Pengembangan Penerimaan Bukan
Pajak (PNBP) Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan. Badan Planologi Departemen Kehutanan,
Jakarta.
Taylor, M., 2019. Norway Starts Payments to Indonesia for Cutting Forest Emissions.
http://news.trust.org/item/20190218111225-swep6/, Accessed date: 3 July 2019.
Tsujino, R., Yumoto, T., Kitamura, S., Djamaluddin, I., Darnaedi, D., 2016. History of
forest loss and degradation in Indonesia. Land Use Policy 57, 335–347.
UNEP, 2016. Fiscal incentives for Indonesian palm oil production: pathways for align-
ment with green growth.
UNFCCC, 2011. Outcome of the work of the ad hoc working group on long-term co-
operative action under the convention. Cancun Agreements.
UNFCCC, 2015. Paris Agreement as Contained in the Report of the Conference of the
Parties on its Twenty-First Session.
UNFCCC, 2016. UNFCCC standing committee on finance 2016 biennial assessment and
overview of climate finance flows report. http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_
support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/application/pdf/2016_ba_
technical_report.pdf, Accessed date: 3 June 2019.
Varkkey, H., Tyson, A., Choiruzzad, S.A.B., 2018. Palm oil intensification and expansion
in Indonesia and Malaysia: environmental and socio-political factors influencing
policy. Forest Policy Econ. 92, 148–159.
Venter, O., Koh, L.P., 2012. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+): Game Changer or Just Another Quick Fix? 1249 (1). Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences, pp. 137–150.
World-Growth, 2011. The Economic Benefit of Palm Oil to Indonesia.
Yustika, A., 2008. Refleksi Subsidi Dalam Perekonomian Indonesia. Bisnis dan Ekonomi
Politik 9 (3), 1–112.
T. Cadman, et al. Forest Policy and Economics 108 (2019) 101913
10
